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The purpose of this short essay is to discuss the influence of intel-
ligence information on the political decision-making process.
At first glance, the problem appears simple: intelligence col-
lects and analyses all data related to a certain political issue, pre-
pares a report, and submits it to the policy maker (PM). The PM
makes a decision which is implied or recommended in the report,
acting under the assumption that the intelligence collectors and
analysts are first-class professionals devoid of selfish or political
motives, and that the PM is a reputable statesman whose only
concern is the safeguarding of national interests.
This is, of course, the ideal situation; from time to time, how-
ever, intelligence reports are ignored by a PM.
A classic example concerns Josef Stalin, who disregarded
intelligence reports about the impending German attack of the
USSR in June, 1941. Stalin was a shrewd and experienced states-
man, and Soviet intelligence was unsurpassed.  There was clearly
something unusual in these events.
I offer another example from personal experience: in the per-
estroika period, Intelligence aggressively and repeatedly warned
Gorbachev, who at that time was the supreme Policy Maker in the
USSR, that the situation was deteriorating in the so-called “Union
of Socialist Countries”, and in our own country as well.
Intelligence pointed out particularly vulnerable areas, warned of
future dangers, and suggested necessary political remedies. The
impact of the Intelligence information on Gorbachov’s policies
was minimal.  Some now claim  that Gorbachev and some of his
Politburo colleagues aimed at the destruction of the Soviet
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Socialist state from the beginning of perestroika, that they were in
fact “stooges of Western imperialism”, and secret agents of
Western intelligence services. There is no reason to suspect Mr.
Gorbachev of evil designs; yet the fact remains that reliable and
alarming information was available and was not acted upon.
It is easy for intelligence veterans to accuse the previous polit-
ical leadership of shortsightedness and even treason.  omponent
of the KGB system); Ministry of Defense; General Staff, with its
Main Intelligence Directorate; Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
International Department of the Party Central Committee; Ministry
of Foreign Trade; etc. This impressive though badly-coordinated
machinery was augmented by the efforts of the heads of polito-
logical, academic institutions (The Institutes of Asia and Africa,
USA and Canada, Far East, Europe, World Economics and
International Relations). To this were added prominent political
observers of the national mass media, and, last but not least, indi-
vidual members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, who
often used their access to the General Secretary (the supreme PM)
to inform him of their views, or pass on inadvertently acquired
information on international issues.
This tremendous amount of information was thoroughly
screened by the PM’s aides, but quite often intelligence reports
were lost in the general melee. The personal contacts of the infor-
mation carriers to the PM were crucial.
In order to cull diverse data on important issues (e.g. disar-
mament, Afghan war, developments in Eastern Europe, etc.) and
prepare proposals for the PM, ad hoc commissions and working
groups would be formed. As a result, intelligence information was
transformed into anonymous analyses and proposals which dilut-
ed the opinions of individual participants. The opinions of acade-
micians or political observers could be ignored (and in fact, they
were seldom summoned for official consultations), but the Foreign
Ministry, KGB, Defense Ministry, and CC International
Departments were expected to present a collective view on all
major problems. In fact, internal harmony in the top echelons was
more important than external issues. Consensus was the founda-
tion of the system.
However, there were exceptions to the general rule. Quite
often those closest to the PM (Messrs. Shevardnadze and
Yakovlev, in particular) were able to influence Gorbachev to dis-
regard the information and opinions of the KGB and military, i.e.,
when Mr. Shevardnadze surrendered to the U.S. an oil-bearing
area in the Bering sea, obtaining a post facto endorsement from
Mr. Gorbachev without consulting the KGB or Defense.
Intelligence handles external issues which require decisions by
the PM. However comprehensive, reliable, and urgent intelligence



























situation, especially internal ones. Stalin’s strange “blindness” on
the eve of the German invasion of the USSR had an obvious
explanation. Stalin was a true policy maker who had no peers
within the Soviet leadership, and he was better informed than any-
body about the actual state of the Soviet armed forces and the
preparedness of the country for a major war. But he valued peace,
and was doing everything possible to stave off the inevitable. It is
worth noting that he gave an order to prepare the total evacua-
tion of Moscow three days after the German attack, on the 25 of
June, 1941, before the German forces had reached Minsk.
Intelligence professionals, both on operational and analytical
levels, should not allow the configuration of forces in the nation-
al leadership to affect their assessments. Unfortunately, this factor
often plays a greater role in political decisions among profession-
als than the actual merits of the case. There is evidence, for exam-
ple, that the idea of introducing Soviet troops in Afghanistan in
1979 was originated by the number two man in the Soviet hierar-
chy, M. Suslov, who exerted great influence on L. Brezhnev. After
these two policy makers had formed their opinion, the rest of the
Politburo was forced to toe the line. Intelligence assessments did
come into the picture after the decision had been taken, but were
tainted by balance of power considerations in the Politburo.
Professionals are always subordinate to politicians; their informa-
tion and conclusions are taken into account only insofar as they
correspond with the ambitions and prejudices of their political
bosses.
Sometimes, a PM gets caught up in an inexorable course of
events and loses his ability to control the developments, both
internally and externally, and, as a result, policies assume a per-
functory quality. That occurred during the period of perestroika in
the USSR. Mr. Gorbachev would occasionally express his irritation
with intelligence reports, not only because they did not coincide
with his views, but because he was helpless in the face of unpleas-
ant realities.
There are other insulating layers between intelligence infor-
mation and political decisions. A Policy Maker in a democratic
country finds it difficult to avoid the temptation to influence the
mood of the electorate, especially in a pre-election period, by ini-
tiating dramatic foreign policy initiatives. And on occasion, for-
eign policy activities are undertaken precisely to divert public
attention from embarrassing situations at home (a fictional situa-
tion of this kind is presented in De Niro’s film, “Wag the Dog”).
And there are numerous examples in history when attempts were
made to ease internal crises by resorting to “a short victorious































On the other hand, intelligence professionals’ complaints
sometimes stem from overestimating their own achievements. An
intelligence report can be absolutely correct in covering a specif-
ic event which takes place at a given time and place. If one’s
sources had obtained documentary information of importance,
i.e., the minutes of a top-secret meeting, or something that
demands attention and action on the part of the PM, facts regard-
ing the actual meeting and its agenda can be confirmed by other
sources.  But if intelligence is then unable to trace ensuing events
and decisions, it would be unfair to blame the PM for failure to
act.
Everything becomes more complicated when intelligence ust
evaluate dynamic, critical situations. The factual information may
reflect the state of affairs at a given moment, but the overall pic-
ture changes constantly. As tension grows,  deliberative decisions
become less significant, and spontaneous forces and human error
assume greater importance. Analysts can, as a rule, predict logi-
cal moves of the parties involved in a given situation, but are help-
less when confronted with human error. Their reports become
vague as a result; they propose various scenarios, and ultimately
leave  the PM “holding the bag”. If things go awry, the PM is then
held responsible.
In sum, intelligence information is an important, but not exclu-
sive, component of policy making. The factors involved are
diverse, variable and sometimes appear irrelevant to the problem
at hand.
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